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Lesser Sanctions Under Rule 41(b):
Prerequisites for Versatility
Few areas of the law are governed by dogma as specifically defined and as
strictly adhered to as the rules of civil procedure. One does not expect to find
innovative interpretation in the realm of procedural formality. Consider, for
example, rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The lan-
guage is succinct and apparently simple enough for a child to apply. For failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim therein against
him or her.1 This rule, which serves to ensure adherence to all the rules of civil
procedure and orders of the court, apparently leaves little room for judicial ma-
neuvering. In applying rule 41, however, "[c]ourts have generally recognized
the need to balance [the] judicial efficiency [protected by the rule] against [the]
plaintiffs' right to meaningful access to the judicial system."'2 By tempering the
facially harsh impact of rule 41(b) with the exercise of judicial discretion when
applying the rule, courts attempt to realize these two goals of efficiency and
access.3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has firmly asserted the power of
the court to shape the rule 41(b) sanction to fit the offense-no longer will appli-
cation of that rule be viewed as an all or nothing proposition. 4
The recent case of Daniels v. Montgomery Mutual Insurance Co.5 gave the
North Carolina Court of Appeals an opportunity to articulate this view. The
court supported the imposition of a lesser sanction than dismissal in response to
the rule 41(b) motion in Daniels, but found the trial court had abused its discre-
tion by imposing such a sanction absent findings concerning both the "effective-
ness of alternative sanctions" and plaintiff's ability to comply with the sanction
actually imposed. 6 The court based its decision on federal case law because no
North Carolina cases were found directly on point and because section (b) of
rule 41 is identical to the federal rule.7 The federal case law discussed by the
court revealed a judicial aversion to dismissing cases unless the violation was
flagrant and lesser sanctions had proved futile.8 This Note examines North Car-
olina's adoption of the federal approach in the Daniels decision. It first analyzes
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of rule 41(b), then reviews the
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 41 (Supp. 1985). The severity of dismissal under this rule is
obvious: "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this sec-
tion and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,... operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
Id.
2. 5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.11[2], at 41-111 (2d
ed. 1986).
3. E.g., Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974)
4. Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 600, 605, 344 S.E.2d 847, 850, disc.
rev. allowed, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 592 (1986).
5. Id
6. Id. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
7. Id. at 603, 344 S.E.2d at 849.
8. Id. at 604-05, 344 S.E.2d at 849-50.
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federal case law the court of appeals considered in its decision. In moving from
the national view to a more localized perspective, the Note emphasizes an inno-
vative early case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
and finally it examines the application of rule 41(b) in North Carolina cases.
On August 17, 1982, plaintiff Daniels filed an action seeking to recover on a
fire insurance policy purchased from defendant.9 Daniels' action was called for
trial three times-the first two instances ended in mistrial. Prior to the first
trial in November 1983, the trial judge granted defendant's motion in limine
"requesting that the plaintiff be prohibited from introducing evidence or refer-
ring to any evidence that no criminal charges had been filed against the plaintiff
on account of the fire."10 The first trial ended in mistrial when plaintiff's coun-
sel informed the court he might be a witness on behalf of his client. 1 The sec-
ond trial ended in mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. 12 In September 1984, the
third trial was held and again ended in mistrial, this time as a result of plaintiff's
violation of the court order prohibiting reference to the fact no criminal charges
had been fied against plaintiff.1 3 "During opening statements to the jury, plain-
tiff's attorney... made the following statement: 'If Jerry Daniels had burned his
house, then he ought to have been prosecuted.' 14 In response to this clear
violation of the court order, defendant moved for a dismissal of plaintiff's case
pursuant to rule 41(b).15 Instead of granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the
trial court "imposed a lesser sanction by ordering that the plaintiff be taxed with
the reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the
defendant in connection with the third trial."' 16 When plaintiff failed to comply
with this order, defendant again moved for dismissal and the trial judge granted
the motion. 17
On review, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court
order imposing the lesser sanction of expenses and attorney's fees was not sup-
ported by adequate factfinding and was therefore erroneous.' 8 Relying on Rog-
ers v. Kroger Co.,1 a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the appellate court adopted the practice of imposing sanctions less
9. Id. at 601, 344 S.E.2d at 848. "Defendant answered denying coverage and alleging that
'plaintiff intentionally caused, procured, or acquiesced in the fire for the fraudulent purpose of col-
lecting insurance benefits.'" Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Judge Robert A. Collier, Jr., presiding at the second trial, reiterated Judge Hobgood's
order granting defendant's motion in limine.
13. Id. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 848. "Prior to the trial Judge James Davis reiterated the prior
court order prohibiting the introduction of evidence or reference to any matter before the jury that
no criminal charges had been filed against the plantiff as a result of the fire." Id. at 601-02, 344
S.E.2d at 848.
14. Id. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 848.
15. Id. Defendant suggested that, in the alternative, an appropriate lesser sanction would be to
tax plaintiff with defendant's costs in defending the action. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 849.
18. Id. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
19. 669 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1982). Some of the alternative lesser sanctions suggested in Rogers
were: "[a]ssessment of fines, costs or damages against the plaintiff or his counsel, attorney discipli-
1126 [Vol. 65
CIVIL PROCEDURE
drastic than dismissal when such sanctions would promote a more just result.20
The court went on to say, however, that bare imposition of lesser sanctions was
not enough.2 1 The use of lesser sanctions required the concomitant evaluation
of those sanctions for both effectiveness and feasibility. 22
The court of appeals also adopted the reasoning of Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil
& Gas Co.,23 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed imposition of a sanction less than dismissal when "plaintiff's lawyer
refused to start the trial because of a conflict in his case schedule."' 24 The Horn-
buckle court demanded that before a lesser sanction is imposed the court must
make "express findings concerning whether plaintiff Hombuckle had the ability
to pay the sum assessed as an alternative to dismissal, and, if not, whether any
sanction less severe than dismissal, including those that might be assessed
against counsel, would be appropriate and sufficient."'25 In ordering plaintiff in
Daniels to pay defendant's costs and attorney's fees for the third trial, the trial
court failed to assess the effectiveness of alternative sanctions and plaintiff's abil-
ity to pay the costs and fees.2 6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, by vacat-
ing both the dismissal and the order taxing costs and attorney's fees against
plaintiff, not only upheld the use of a lesser sanction, but improved the image of
such sanctions by requiring they be found effective and appropriate prior to
implementation.2 7
To analyze the effect Daniels will have on the use of rule 41(b) in North
Carolina, the origin and purpose of the rule must first be considered. At com-
mon law there were no provisions for dismissing an action and the rare invoca-
tion of dismissal was construed as a nonsuit. 28 The premise of this construction
was that under either dismissal or nonsuit cases were not decided on their mer-
its.29 The court's power to dismiss has been described as "inherent" and the
promulgation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 in 1938 served as federal
nary measures, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings .... ." Id. at
321.
20. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 604, 344 S.E.2d at 849-50.
21. Id. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
22. Id. The court did not specifically state that the district court had "abused its discretion" in
dismissing plaintiff's case, but the failure to make the necessary findings of fact was unequivocally
labeled as error. Id.
23. 732 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1198 (1986). Hornbuckle revolved
around plaintiff's counsel scheduling himself to be in both Fort Worth and Dallas. The Dallas judge
telephoned the Fort Worth judge who agreed to continue counsel's case. Plaintiff's counsel, having
planned on being in Fort Worth, refused to start trial in Dallas because he was unable to "shift
gears" from his involvement in the Fort Worth case. Id. at 1235.
24. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
25. Hornbuckle, 732 F.2d at 1237.
26. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
27. Id.
28. 2 T. WILSON & J. WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA PRAMCTCE AND PROCEDURE § 1641, at 121
(2d ed. 1956).
29. Id. "[D]ismissing an action.., was a regular proceeding in equity by which the plaintiff
could end his suit at any time before decree upon the payment of costs, or the suit was dismissed
upon the merits." Id.
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statutory recognition of this power. 30 The rule was primarily aimed at minimiz-
ing instances in which plaintiffs sought to punish defendants by dragging them
into court and keeping them there, thus undermining the judicial system and
abusing individual courts. 31 North Carolina adopted the federal rule in 1967,32
although the power of the court to dismiss for failure to prosecute already was
well established and state statutes had long provided for court control over its
own affairs.33
Because rule 41(b) is a federal rule, it is subject to United States Supreme
Court interpretation. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.34 is the seminal Supreme
Court case interpreting rule 41(b). In Link the Court upheld the dismissal of a
six-year-old civil case marred with delays that culminated in plaintiff's attor-
ney's unexplained failure to appear at a pretrial conference. 3 5 The Link decision
emphasized the purposes of rule 41(b) by asserting three points. First, federal
courts have authority "to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution" based not
on a rule or statute, but on their inherent power "to manage their own affairs."'36
Despite the purported "inherentness" of this power, the Court gave considerable
weight to the deliberateness of the attorney's failures before exercising the power
"within the bounds of permissible discretion."' 37 Second, courts need not give
notice to plaintiff that the case has been dismissed. 38 Third, the Court refused to
excuse plaintiff for errors attributable primarily to his or her attorney. 39 The
Court noted:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of peti-
tioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an
unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney
30. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2361, at 149 (1971).
31. McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940); see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ IA-I, Rule 41 comment.
32. An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Civil Procedure, ch. 954, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws
1274, 1316 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 41 (Supp. 1985)).
33. Motion for nonsuit was earlier governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-183 (1943), repealed by
Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 954, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274: "When on trial of an issue of fact in a
civil action or special proceeding, the plaintiff has introduced his-evidence and rested his case, the
defendant may move to dismiss the action, or for judgment as in case of nonsuit." In nonjury trials
the motion for nonsuit has been replaced by the motion for a dismissal. See Phillips v. Woxman, 43
N.C. App. 739, 741, 260 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 545, 265 S.E.2d 404, cert
denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
The motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, prior to adoption of rule 41(b), was governed by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-222 (1943), repealed by Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 954, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws
1274. Subsection (4) of this section stated: "The court may also dismiss the complaint, with costs in
favor of one or more defendants, in case of unreasonable neglect on the part of the plaintiff to serve
the summons on other defendants, or to proceed in the cause against the defendant or defendants
served." Id.
34. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
35. Id. at 633-34. Link was a personal injury case that the Court dismissed sua sponte. Id. at
627-29.
36. Id. at 629-30.
37. Id. at 633-34. The Court stated that "it could reasonably be inferred from his absence, as
well as from the drawn.out history of the litigation [that plaintiff's counsel was] deliberately pro-
ceeding in dilatory fashion." Id.
38. Id. at 632.
39. Id. at 633-34.
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as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the conse-
quences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.4°
In dissent, Justice Black vehemently criticized the majority opinion as "a
good illustration of the deplorable kind of injustice that can come from the ac-
ceptance of any such mechanical rule."'4 1 He argued for the plaintiff's right to
rely minimally on an attorney, and against application of the rule as a boon to
judicial efficiency.4 2 Because dismissal based on attorney failue is directed at
otherwise meritorious lawsuits, "such dismissals will be more than offset by the
increased burden on appellate courts." 43
The lower courts' reviews of rule 41(b) dismissals routinely rely on evidence
of a deliberate record of delay in assessing trial court action according to the
abuse of discretion standard propounded in Link.44 However, in applying that
standard federal courts have limited permissible discretion in ways more attuned
to Justice Black's dissent than to the majority opinion.45 The language of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Poulis v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co.4 6 is illustrative:
Although sanctions are a necessary part of any court system, we are
concerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of
dismissal as a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be
contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which the meritorious
claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue.47
Circuit courts have recognized the severity of a dismissal with prejudice under
rule 41(b) and consequently have been wary of imposing such a sanction absent
a showing of "a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
40. Id.
41. Id. at 645 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black felt plaintiff's delays were not extraordinary
and found defendant's lawyers and the trial judge more blameworthy than plaintiff for the delays.
Justice Black blamed the trial judge for a three-year delay caused by his erroneous initial dismissal of
the case. Plaintiff's delay in answering interrogatories was dwarfed by defendant's six-year delay in
conceiving and preparing them. Id. at 637-41 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 647-49 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted:
[I]t seems to me to be contrary to the most fundamental ideas of fairness and justice to
impose the punishment for the lawyer's failure to prosecute upon the plaintiff who, so far
as this record shows, was simply trusting his lawyer to take care of his case as clients
generally do.
Id. at 643 (Black, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (litigation
characterized by consistent delay of plaintiff's counsel); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677
F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[D]ismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those
cases where there is a clear record of delay ...."); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir.
1974) ("facts do not depict 'a drawn out history' of 'deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion' as
in Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 .... ); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling
Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Somewhere along the line, the rights of the defend-
ants to be free from costly and harassing litigation must be considered. So too must the time and
energies of our courts .... "), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972); Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry.
Co., 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1967) (relying on Link, court notes dismissal only in cases of "a clear
record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff").
45. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
46. 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 867.
1987] 1129
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
plaintiff."'48
In evaluating the propriety of trial court decisions to dismiss, circuit courts
consistently have looked for a clear record of delay, and have evaluated contu-
maciousness in terms of the applicability of lesser sanctions.49 In Industrial
Building Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp. 50 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit found the district court had improperly dismissed the
case for noncompliance with a court order without considering other alterna-
tives.5 1 The court stated that the district court's exercise was reviewable, but
"would certainly not be so vulnerable to challenge were it not for the question of
whether suitable alternatives to dismissal were available."' 52 Another important
consideration in assessing plaintiff contumaciousness was whether the delay or
disobedience was intentional.5 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in First Iowa Hydro Electric Cooperative v. Iowa-Illinois Gas &
Electric Co. ,4 upheld the trial court's dismissal based on the "wilful and deliber-
ate" refusal of plaintiffs to comply with court orders to testify and to make a
deposit for master's fees.55
Basing an abuse of discretion standard on a showing of plaintiff procrastina-
tion and contumaciousness may have provided a minimal guide, but reviewing
courts began to create their own formulas to make the standard more workable.
In Rogers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit succinctly
enunciated a formula for reviewing trial court use of rule 41(b) dismissal.5 6 This
formula breaks down the criteria for dismissing an action into two requisite and
three aggravating factors.57 The requisite factors are: (1) a clear record of delay
and (2) a finding that imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile.5 8 Requisite
factors are the most pervasively articulated and can, by themselves, justify dis-
48. Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982), quoted in Poulis
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 747 F.2d 863, 866 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868-
69 ("this litigation has been characterized by a consistent delay by plaintiff's counsel"; in determin-
ing whether the attorney's conduct was willfull or not, however, the court found "no basis for term-
ing counsel's conduct in this case 'contumacious' "); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir.
1974) (court noted that dismissal was appropriate only in extreme circumstances and cited the lan-
guage of Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that dismissal was only permitted "in the
face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff."
49. See, eg., Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1982); Von Poppenheim v. Portland
Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972). In
Von Poppenheim, two lesser sanctions proved futile--plaintiff refused to file a specific pretrial state-
ment promptly, and when the statement was filed it did not conform to the court order for specific-
ity. Id. at 1050-51.
50. 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).
51. Id. at 1338-39.
52. Id. at 1339.
53. Courts were invoking the ground of "deliberateness" stressed in the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Link. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. 245 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
55. Id. at 628-29.
56. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 320.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 651130
CIVIL PROCEDURE
missal.5 9 Aggravating factors, on the other hand, refine the overall analysis of
court discretion by identifying and incorporating case-specific considerations
that help either to justify or undermine trial court implementation of rule 41(b)
dismissal.60 They are reminiscent of the considerations Justice Black feared
would lay dormant if the Link majority decision was mechanically applied.6 1
The three aggravating factors are: "the extent to which the plaintiff, as distin-
guished from his counsel, was personally responsible for the delay, the degree of
actual prejudice to the defendant, and whether the delay was the result of inten-
tional conduct."' 62 The Fifth Circuit, replete with decisions recognizing various
factors, clarified the factor-by-factor analysis into a workable formula for re-
viewing dismissals. 63
When the court applied its formula to the facts in Rogers, an employment
discrimination action, it found no clear record of delay, no indication that the
trial court had considered lesser sanctions, and none of the aggravating elements
"present in most of the prior dismissals [the court had] affirmed."' In assessing
the aggravating factors the court emphasized that plaintiff's attorney, not the
plaintiff, was blameworthy, that the defendant offered no evidence of actual prej-
udice, and that delays were a product of "ineptitude" rather than intentional
disobedience. 65
Given the clarity of the Rogers analysis it is not surprising that other cir-
cuits adopted its factor-by-factor approach in reviewing their own dismissals.
The Poulis case, which involved a more complicated application of the factors
enunciated in Rogers, is an example of such a case. Plaintiffs in Poulis sought to
recover on a fire insurance policy and defendant denied liability.6 6 The trial
court found that plaintiffs took no action seeking discovery, failed to answer
State Farm's interrogatories, and "did not file their pre-trial statement ... as
required."' 67 After being advised that his statement was overdue, plaintiff's
counsel promised to submit the statement the next day but failed to do so.6 8 The
district court dismissed the case sua sponte and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit reviewed this exercise of discretion using the Rogers
criteria as well as a sixth factor-the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's original
claim.
6 9
59. Id. at 320 n.5.
60. Id. at 320.
61. Link, 370 U.S. at 648-49 (Black, J., dissenting)
62. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 320.
63. Id. at 320-23.
64. Id. at 322.
65. Id. at 322-23. Determining whether the defendant is prejudiced is often a difficult task
because any delay could be interpreted as somewhat prejudicial unless the defendant was directly
responsible for it. "[S]ome courts have held that prejudice resulting from a delay may be presumed."
5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, J. WICKER, supra note 2, § 41.11[2], at 41-131.
66. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 865.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 868-70. The Poulis court did not attribute its analysis to the Rogers formula and did
not distinguish between requisite and aggravating factors, but did state that it was "guided by the
manner in which the trial court balanced" factors identical to those enunciated in Rogers. Id. at 868.
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Review of the facts in Poulis revealed a "pattern of dilatoriness," but it also
exposed an erroneous district court conclusion that no other sanctions were ap-
propriate. 70 The circuit court suggested that the trial court "could have im-
posed on plaintiff's counsel the costs, including attorney's fees," directly caused
by counsel's dilatoriness.71 The court also found no culpability on the part of
plaintiff for the late pre-trial statement and "no basis for terming counsel's con-
duct in this case 'contumacious.' "72 The circuit court did find, however, that
defendant had been prejudiced by the delays and failures to answer interrogato-
ries.73 In terms of the Rogers formula, the Poulis case contained the requisite
factor of a history of delay, which alone could justify dismissal, and one aggra-
vating factor, prejudice to the defendant.74 The Poulis court, in assessing its
sixth factor, meritoriousness of the claim, found weaknesses in plaintiff's asser-
tions.75 The court concluded that, although it might have decided the question
differently, it found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's dismissal order.76
The Poulis decision reveals how the Rogers factor-by-factor analysis makes exer-
cise and review of discretionary dismissal less of a mystery by identifying the
pivotal criteria that come into play when courts exercise such discretion.
Although Rogers provided an evolutionary framework for reviewing dismis-
sal, its factors were gleaned from prior cases in which courts had implemented
the factors in their own way. 7 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in Reizakis v. Loy, 78 also borrowed individual criteria from cir-
cuit court precedents throughout the federal system in an effort to make its anal-
ysis of rule 41(b) more thorough.79 The Reizakis court did not distinguish
between requisite and aggravating factors nor did it provide as thorough a
framework as Rogers, but it did develop a review approach consisting of factors
identical to those used in Rogers eight years later.80 Furthermore, the Reizakis
opinion emphasized that rule 41(b) is discretionary by stating that "courts inter-
preting the rule uniformly hold that it cannot be automatically or mechanically
applied."81 The court reiterated the concern expressed in Justice Black's dissent
70. Id. at 868-69.
71. Id. at 869.
72. Id. at 868-69.
73. Id. at 868. The court found prejudice in that defendant was "obliged to file its pretrial
statement without the opportunity to review plaintiffs' pretrial statement which was due to be filed
first." Id.
74. Id. at 868-70; see supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
75. Id. at 869-70. Plaintiff's claim was in fact untimely because it was not brought within one
year of the loss, as was required by the policy, but the trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss on this ground because the motion was filed more than two weeks after the close of discovery
in violation of court "policy." Id. at 870.
76. Id.
77. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 320-21. The court provided a citation list of prior cases and the factors
they used to review dismissal. Id. at 320.
78. 490 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 1135.
80. Id. The court of appeals found no deliberate delay, no personal responsibility on the part of
plaintiff, no actual prejudice to defendant, and no effort by the trial court to consider alternative
measures. Id. at 1135-36.
81. Id. at 1135.
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in Link by noting judicial reluctance to punish a client for the behavior of his or
her lawyer: "[w]here a party is not responsible for the fault of his attorney,
dismissal may be invoked only in extreme circumstances.18 2
The factors considered in Reizakis and restructured in Rogers provide a
surprisingly firm footing for appellate court review according to a standard as
elusive as "abuse of discretion." The analysis these cases supply, combined with
a pervasive recognition that dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction, illu-
minate the federal courts' aversion to dismissal absent the flagrant violation of
court rules or orders, and the futility of lesser sanctions.
Some of the factors that federal circuit court cases have recognized have
been adopted by North Carolina courts. Most of the North Carolina cases focus
on the first part of rule 41(b), which allows dismissal for violation of another
rule of civil procedure. Although these cases are not directly on point with Dan-
iels, which involved a violation of a specific court order instead of a rule, they do
illustrate North Carolina treatment of dismissal decisions. In Harris v.
Maready 8 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of
a motion to dismiss and reversed the North Carolina Court of Appeals' contrary
holding.8 4 Plaintiff in Harris violated rule 8(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states in part: "wherein the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading shall
not state the demand for monetary relief, but shall state that the relief demanded
is for damages incurred or to be incurred in excess of ten thousand dollars
($10,000) .... ,"85 Plaintiff violated the rule by demanding an amount in excess
of five million dollars in her complaint in a malpractice suit against a law firm.8 6
In its discretion the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss.8 7
In upholding the trial court decision, the supreme court in Harris, relying
on cases in New York and Washington, stated:
We agree with the view expressed in other jurisdictions that dismissal
for a violation of Rule 8(a)(2) is not always the best sanction available
to the trial court and is certainly not the only sanction available.
Although an action may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for a plaintiff's
failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), this extreme sanction is to be ap-
plied only when the trial court determines that less drastic sanctions
will not suffice.88
82. Id.
83. 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).
84. Id. at 552, 319 S.E,2d at 922.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 8(a)(2)(1983).
86. Harris, 311 N.C. at 549-50, 319 S.E.2d at 920-21.
87. Id. at 550, 319 S.E,2d at 921.
88. Id. at 551, 319 S.E.2d at 921-22. The New York case was Pizzingrilli v. Von Kessel, 100
Misc. 2d 1062, 1065-66, 420 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542-43 (1979), in which the court expressed the view that
dismissal was too drastic a sanction for violation of the prohibition against stating an amount of
money demanded. The Washington case was McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285
(1980), in which a doctor unsuccessfully attempted to sue for defamation a plaintiff who violated a
state prohibition on stating amount of damages in a malpractice suit. The court upheld the trial
court's determination that the statute was procedural, not substantive. Id. at 267, 621 P.2d at 1286.
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In addition to this emphasis on lesser sanctions, North Carolina courts have also
recognized the deliberateness of a violation as a factor in assessing the propriety
of dismissal.
The court of appeals in Stokes v. Wilson and Redding Law Firm9 explained
the significance of deliberateness by distinguishing the violations in Stokes and in
Harris from the violation in the earlier case of Schell v. Coleman." In Schell
plaintiff failed to amend his complaint when given the opportunity, and aggra-
vated his violation by serving the defendant-attorney in open court.9 1 In Harris
plaintiff failed to amend, but did not aggravate the situation so egregiously. In
Stokes the violation was even less blatant because plaintiff was never given an
opportunity to cure his violation.92 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Stokes, based on the rationale of Harris, found the trial court had erred in
dismissing plaintiff's complaints with prejudice.9 3 Indeed, North Carolina
courts give considerable weight to the aggravating factor of contumaciousness
recognized in the federal system.
Butler Service Co. v. Butler Service Group94 addressed the aggravating fac-
tor of plaintiff counsel's personal culpability.9" Butler focused on a violation of
rule 3 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts that
states "when an attorney has conflicting engagements in different courts, priority
shall be as follows: appellate courts, superior court, district court, magistrate's
court." 96 Plaintiff's counsel was in district court when his case was called in
superior court.97 The court of appeals pointed out that "[p]laintiff. . .was
standing outside of superior courtroom #304, ready and willing to prosecute its
case at the time the case was dismissed." s9 8 In distinguishing between violations
attributable to plaintiff personally and violations attributable to counsel, the
court suggested that imposition of sanctions against attorneys "are clearly more
palatable than the Rule 41(b) dismissal in this case." 99
These earlier North Carolina cases indicate that the factors worthy of con-
sideration in federal court review are deemed equally worthy in North Carolina
appellate review. The Daniels decision emphasized this point by approving trial
court imposition of lesser sanctions pursuant to rule 41(b) when a plaintiff has
89. 72 N.C. App. 107, 323 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
90. 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662 (1983); see Stokes, 72 N.C. App. at 116-18, 323 S.E.2d at
476-78.
91. Schell, 65 N.C. App. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664. The aggravation did not stop at service.
Plaintiff informed the North Carolina Department of Insurance that "a lawsuit existed against [de-
fendant] attorneys in the amount of two million dollars ($2,000,000) for misappropriations, and
[caused] adverse radio and newspaper publicity." Id.
92. Stokes, 72 N.C. App. at 116-17, 323 S.E.2d at 477.
93. Id. at 118, 323 S.E.2d at 478.
94. 66 N.C. App. 132, 310 S.E.2d 406 (1984).
95. Id. at 133, 310 S.E.2d at 406.
96. Id. at 134, 310 S.E.2d at 407. The General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District
Courts were adopted pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-34 (Supp. 1985).
97. Butler, 66 N.C. App. at 134, 310 S.E.2d at 407. The court noted, "Rule [3] does not defi-
nitely address the 'Catch-22' plaintiff's counsel found himself in .... Id.
98. Id. at 135, 310 S.E.2d at 408.
99. Id.
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violated a specific court order.l °0 The Daniels court noted that the trial court
had the equitable power to impose attorney's fees "when the interests of justice
so require" and cited a recent statutory provision allowing "the assessment of
attorney's fees against a party in cases where the court finds 'that there was a
complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing
party in any pleading .... ."101 In addition to the court's inherent power to
manage and control its proceedings, the Daniels court noted "North Carolina
courts have the inherent power to impose fines and sanctions against an attorney
for disobeying a court order."10 2 The emphasis is on preserving the plaintiff's
claim if less stringent measures will cure the plaintiff's offense.
Although the Daniels court did not use all of the factors enumerated in
Rogers, an evaluation of the Daniels facts in terms of those factors illustrates
how North Carolina has adopted some of the federal tactics for reviewing dis-
missals. First, the events in Daniels reveal no clear record of delay. 103 Second,
the trial court imposed a lesser sanction with which plaintiff failed to comply.'1 4
Third, the facts indicated and plaintiff's counsel strenuously argued that "plain-
tiff was blameless and that the violation of the motion in limine was due solely to
the actions of his counsel at trial."' 0 5 Fourth, the degree of actual prejudice to
defendant, as indicated by the sanction imposed by the trial court, was limited to
the expenses incurred by defendant in connection with the third trial.10 6 Fifth,
the court made no finding of intentional misconduct, despite defendant's asser-
tion that the record left no doubt that plaintiff's failure was intentional.' 0 7 Ac-
cording to this five part formula, the facts of Daniels yield one requisite factor-
the futility of a lesser sanction-and possibly one aggravating factor-inten-
tional misconduct. Under this analysis, the trial court was arguably within its
permissible discretion in dismissing the case.
The primary significance of Daniels is that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals found the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing on these
facts.10 8 The "abuse" did not result from total ignorance of one of the impor-
100. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
101. Id. at 603, 344 S.E.2d at 848-49. The court was referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5
(Supp. 1985).
102. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 604, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
103. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 601-02, 344 S.E.2d at 849-50. The Daniels court did not make
specific findings with regard to each factor, but each factor can be approximately evaluated using the
facts on record. Certainly the delay resulting from the first two trials cannot be blamed on plaintiff
dilatoriness. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
104. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 848.
105. Id. at 604, 344 S.E.2d at 849. The fact the violation in Daniels occurred as a result of a
statement by plaintiff's attorney in court weakens the contention that plaintiff was personally
blameworthy.
106. Id. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 848.
107. Brief for Appellee at 8, Daniels (No. 8522SC1011). "Mhe record leaves no doubt that the
plaintiff's failure to comply with Judge Davis' Order was intentional." Id. The reason the court of
appeals did not evaluate plaintiff's intent in failing to comply with the order taxing costs (Judge
Davis' Order) was its conclusion that the order was erroneously issued. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at
605, 344 S.E.2d at 850. The critical intent of the Rogers analysis in Daniels is the intent connected
with plaintiff's counsel's misconduct in court.
108. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
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tant factors, but from too cursory an application of a lesser sanction.10 9 The
Daniels decision hinged on the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff was not per-
sonally blameworthy and that a lesser sanction was appropriate.110 The abuse
occurred in concluding that imposition of costs and attorney's fees on plaintiff
was the appropriate lesser sanction without adequate factfinding, then dis-
missing the case based on plaintiff's failure to comply with this "appropriate"
lesser sanction. 1"
Many federal court decisions have merely urged the imposition of lesser
sanctions, but have not expressly required the district courts to determine
whether the lesser sanction would be feasible and effective. 112 This loose re-
quirement probably results because those courts were dealing with cases in
which the notion of alternative sanctions was not even broached. In Von Pop-
penheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Commission 113 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court dismissal in which two
attempted alternative sanctions had proved futile.' 14 The court noted that
"[t]he district judge.., need not exhaust [all sanctions] before finally dismissing
a case. The exercise of his discretion to dismiss requires only that possible and
meaningful alternatives be reasonably explored, bearing in mind the drastic fore-
closure of rights that dismissal effects."
'1 15
The "reasonable exploration" suggested in Von Poppenheim was refined by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hornbuckle to in-
clude a court determination of plaintiff's ability to comply with the sanction
imposed.' 16 The practicality for requiring such a determination is unquestiona-
ble, but few circuits actually have imposed such a requirement on district courts.
Daniels is chiefly significant in that it adopts the Hornbuckle approach and in-
corporates that decision's prerequisites for imposition of sanctions into the
formula for reviewing dismissals.1 17 The Daniels decision makes clear that in
North Carolina, when a court chooses to impose a sanction less harsh than dis-
missal under rule 41(b), it must first determine the effectiveness and feasibility of
the sanction in order to withstand appellate review.' 18 The logic behind such a
requirement is so clear that perhaps other appellate courts have assumed that
trial courts would undertake the necessary factfinding without a specific require-
ment to do so. In light of Daniels, the North Carolina Court of Appeals now
109. Id.
110. Id. at 602, 344 S.E.2d at 848.
111. Id. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
112. See cases cited supra note 44. The main objective of the circuit courts was to expose the
district courts to the availability of other sanctions. See supra text accompanying note 51-52.
113. 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972).
114. Id. at 1053-54. The court had attempted unsuccessfully to have plaintiff arrange for substi-
tute counsel and to continue the proceedings in order to allow plaintiff to come into compliance with
a pretrial order. Id. at 1053.
115. Id. at 1053-54. "There is no requirement, however, that every single alternative be ex-
amined." 5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, J. WICKER, supra note 3, § 41.11[2], at 41-129 to -130.
116. Hornbuckle, 732 F.2d at 1237.
117. Daniels, 81 N.C. App. at 605, 344 S.E.2d at 850.
118. Id.
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requires not only that courts shape the rule 41(b) sanction to fit the offense, but
also that the sanction fit the plaintiff's pocketbook.' 19
DANIEL W. CLARK
119. Id.
